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Introduction: The Vision 
For centuries, Iraq has held a strategic geopolitical position in the Middle East region. Since the 
late nineteenth century, Iraq has attracted foreign interest in its oil wealth. Toward the future, 
Iraq's strategic importance will extend beyond the drive for the democratization and economic 
liberalization of the Middle East, as part of a wider movement for civil liberties within a 
globalization thrust.  
Iraq also has the potential of being a successful economic model as well as a major energy 
supplier to the developed economies as well as the emerging giant Asian economies of China, 
India and South Korea.[1] At national level, the economic and social welfare of Iraqis will be 
substantially improved. At present, however, the perception is that the cost of losing the war 
against terrorism and failing in maintaining stability and nation-rebuilding would be devastating to 
the Iraqis, and the risk of neglecting Iraq would be tremendous for the region, and to the strategic 
interests of United States and its allies. 
Since the fall of the former dictatorial regime on April 9, 2003, costly efforts have unfortunately 
failed to maintain security, revive the damaged economy, and improve the harsh living conditions. 
The accumulated effects of economic hardships and social misery have added to the widespread 
damage inflicted by vicious terrorist attacks, violence, crime, and corruption that impede 
economic improvement.  
However, Iraqis have been and remain in acute anguish, and are hoping for a rapid improvement. 
The successful election on January 30, 2005, and the approval of a new constitution in a 
referendum by the majority of Iraqis, have sustained hope, but the subsequent political disarray, 
social disturbance, and continuous terrorist attacks, coupled with the country's economic 
mismanagement, have retarded the initiative for changing the prevailing depressed conditions. 
Iraq's future success, nevertheless, depends not only on political and social stability, maintaining 
security, promoting democracy, economic liberalization, and the availability of oil wealth. Equally 
important, modern Iraq must have visionary, imaginative, inspiring, and accountable leaders; and 
governments and political parties that are able to design new national strategies, regulate the 
macro-economy, and efficiently implement a reconstruction program. Protection of non-renewable 
resource—oil, gas, mineral resources, cultivatable land, human resources—and minimizing the 
social cost of their depletion should be seriously considered by the state as a necessary condition 
for economic growth, and sustainable development. 
Especially essential, Iraq needs an indigenous, entrepreneurial private sector to contribute more 
to GDP and public finance. In this respect, a gradual but steady policy of compromise must be 
pursued to neutralize the political and financial power of oil revenues in domestic politics, and that 
requires intensive efforts for capacity building of government institutions.  
In the short-run, an integrated public works program consisting of labor-intensive projects should 
be proposed by the federal government (FG) and the governorates, and implemented by private 
sector. 
A New Initiative  
Since the collapse of the previous regime, it was clear that the terrorists' strategy has been to 
obstruct the establishment of a new democratic and secular state in Iraq through the destruction 
of infrastructure and public utilities, and by disrupting normal economic activities. It was also clear 
that there exist causal relationships between unemployment, poverty, deterioration of living 
standards, violence, and terrorist attacks. It was also obvious that the failure of economic policies 
and widespread corruption have contributed to the perpetuation of this harmful situation.  
Despite the lack of public debate and transparency, one part of the virtuous efforts to break these 
vicious circles is to review and modify current economic policies. Unfortunately, neither the Iraqi 
government nor its U.S. ally has adopted appropriate economic strategies and policies for dealing 
with the prevailing acute problems. The government's "National Development Strategy of 2005-
2007" (NDS), which was the product of long-term preparations and widely discussed by the IMF 
and World Bank experts,[2] did very little to improve the present policies made by the former 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).[3] Although admitting the failure of U.S. economic strategy 
in Iraq, advocates have not been able to suggest a suitable alternative which recognizes the real 
driving factors behind the dynamics of Iraq's political economy and set the suitable conditions for 
economic revival. 
Some U.S. advocates suggest that while "the United States will need to maintain its central role in 
rehabilitating the Iraqi economy," they identify unemployment as the most urgent problem. The 
remedy they proposed was to implement labor- intensive public works projects through Iraqi 
private sector and fi nanced by the November 2003 $18.4 billion U.S. grant to Iraq.[4] Contrary to 
the former U.S. economic policies in Iraq, this suggestion, though viable and necessary to 
alleviate the acute unemployment, reduces the requirements of Iraq's economic revival and 
reconstruction to only a public works program. In fact, an urgent public works program in the 
amount of $2-3 billion has been suggested by the author since mid-2003 in order to tackle the 
unemployment problem, but was conditioned as part of a comprehensive reconstruction program 
and consistent with the required macroeconomic policies and structural reforms.[5] 
Robert Looney, while admitting the failure of the neo-liberal/Washington Consensus free market 
development strategy in Iraq, raised his concern that "the danger today is that the current 
economic malaise will deteriorate to the point where the economy will stabilize in a 
poverty/violence trap." He has suggested "instead of the neo-liberal stress on liberalization, 
stabilization, and privatization, the evolutionary approach focuses on creating the institutional 
underpinning of markets needed to insure strong entrepreneurial development." He also 
proposed that "distributing a certain percentage of oil revenues to the Iraqi public through the 
creation of an oil fund would provide added demand for a wide range of domestic consumer 
goods. Part of this payment to Iraqis could be made conditional on participation in local clean-up 
programs while short-term training programs were providing the skills needed by private 
companies."[6] Unfortunately, such propositions may not help to improve economic policy 
priorities. Even worse, some of the proposals have a demagogic nature such as cash distribution 
of oil revenues among citizens, while some practices lack transparency such as the "encrypted" 
monetary policy that hides behind the new law of the central bank.[7] 
Significantly, the new U.S. initiative, the "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq"[8] of November 
2005, has rightly and adequately determined six core assumptions: 
1. Iraq has the potential to be prosperous and self-sustaining;  
2. A free and prosperous Iraq is in the economic interest of everybody;  
3. A growing economy will increase the economic welfare of Iraqis;  
4. Economic change will be steady but gradual;  
5. Iraq can be a reliable and contributing partner in the international community; and  
6. Iraq will need financial support from the region and international community.  
Also important, the new U.S. economic strategy in Iraq has identified some challenges that 
implicitly have more realistic expectations than the former CPA economic laws. These challenges 
are, increasing oil production, reconstruction of basic infrastructure, increasing electricity 
production, creating a banking infrastructure, balancing the need for economic reforms, 
encouraging local and regional capacity building, facilitating progress toward a market-oriented 
economy by reforming commercial laws, and encouraging many in the region and the 
international community to disburse their (financial) pledges.  
While the identified challenges may be relevant to the overall U.S. strategy in Iraq, they may not 
help to tackle the real economic problems of the country, as they concentrate the solution on 
increasing oil production (revenues) and economic growth in terms of GDP. It is true that 
maximizing oil production is in the interest of Iraq at this stage, but this objective should be 
subject to many economic, social, political, and institutional conditions which have to be 
described as clear as the given strategic logic behind the economic track. The strategic 
assessment of economic progress centers on GDP estimates and growth. However, economic 
development and the living standards of Iraqis can not be judged at this stage by GDP and GDP 
per capita estimates simply because the value added by the oil sector is the main share of GDP, 
as well as the prevailing practical problems surrounding these estimates that reduce their 
reliability. 
This paper is based on propositions that identify Iraq's strategic economic and political elements, 
macroeconomic policies, structural reforms, and the infrastructure's reconstruction priorities, 
which were put forward before and after the fall of Saddam's regime.[9] It restates and slightly 
modifies these proposals to consider the recent changes in the balance of political power and its 
likely implications as manifested by the importance of the general election and the approval of the 
new constitution. The latter significantly established the basic civil and political liberties, the 
federalist system with the decentralization of government decision-making processes, while 
failing to define clearly the crucial responsibility of the central government in designing oil wealth 
development strategy and policies, though it highlighted the necessity for close coordination with 
the FG and governorates.[10] The exclusive role of central government in utilizing oil revenues is 
vital for the economic revival of a unified Iraq.[11] 
Institutionally, an indigenous non-political and independent entity, namely, the Iraqi Development 
and Reconstruction Council (IDRC), was suggested to assume the reconstruction tasks of nation-
wide infrastructure instead of the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI),[12] and to replace the rigid 
practices of the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MOPDC).[13]  
The IDRC would facilitate the sharing of the benefits from oil revenues as recognized by the 
constitution. It would also encourage public-private participation and preserve mutual interests 
and coordination with the concerned international parties, mainly USAID, the World Bank, the IMF, 
the UN, and donor countries. IDRC would also play a major role in the diffusion of modern 
technology and promote innovation capacities at project levels. It would consider the 
environmental dimension of the targeted economic growth, and social development—i.e. 
protecting non-renewable resources, especially oil, gas, and sulphur, as well as improving the 
skill and expertise of human resources. 
The aim of this paper is to advance the national interest by addressing the economic problems 
that are not taken by the elected parties (government) or by the United States, which continues to 
play a pivotal political and economic role in Iraq.[14] 
This initiative denies implicitly the suggestion that the lack of information and detailed statistical 
data disrupts the process of designing an adequate economic strategy for Iraq,[15] as well as 
lessening the use of economic freedom criteria as sufficient conditions for increasing economic 
growth.[16] Nor does it consider the stable foreign exchange rate of Iraqi dinar to the U.S. dollar 
as a genuine result of sound economic policy.[17] Instead, the given views put more emphasis on 
the nation's need for a formal future vision and institutional economic guidelines that would create 
confidence in government policies, and to influence positively the dynamics of Iraq's strategic 
factors: oil power, economic and social development, and democracy.[18] 
Specifically, the purpose is two-fold:  
1. First, to highlight Iraq's urgent demand for new, and inspiring, economic strategy and 
policies, as well as for identifying reconstruction priorities within a comprehensive 
plan.[19] Since Iraq will continue to face leadership and decision-making problems,[20] 
such an initiative is essential to restore public discipline and regain the authority and 
credibility that raises hope and maintains public interests.  
2. Second, it argues against the call (imposed) for unconditional adoption of hasty ("shock 
therapy") economic liberalization.  
Iraq's Economic Prospects 
The unique strategic advantages of Iraq—its geopolitical position in the Middle East and as a 
major world energy (oil & gas) supplier,[21] coupled with its human endowment—explains the 
foreign conflict of interests in the country and the need for a stable and prosperous Iraq. For 
Iraqis, both the immediate and longer-term task is to utilize its abundant human and natural 
resources for rebuilding its infrastructure and institutions, preserving political stability and security, 
sustaining social cohesion, increasing economic growth and employment, diminishing poverty, 
and raising the living standards. 
The Iraqi economic experience during 1950s, 1960s and 1970s proved it has the capacity and 
political will for achieving higher economic growth and employment as well as for building public 
utilities and physical and social infrastructure. Indicators of GDP per capita, basic education, 
public health, social services, expansion of oil production capacities, industrial development 
(especially electricity and manufacturing industries), transportation, water resources development, 
irrigation, and flood control all support such positive assessment. However, the backward political 
agenda of Saddam's dictatorial regime and its misuse of oil revenues have caused a continuous 
deterioration of the economy since 1980.[22] In particular, the policy of utilization of oil revenues 
in building the infrastructure was very clear though not successfully implemented. However, 
compared with the post-war experience from April 2003 to 2005, it was better than current 
policies and practices.  
Indeed, since the fall of Saddam's oppressive regime, the deteriorating economy, the damaged 
infrastructure, the shortage of public utilities and basic social services, have not been improving 
as many had hoped and anticipated. In particular, high unemployment has not been alleviated.[23]  
Since the fall of Saddam's regime, actual oil revenues and government expenditures confirm the 
increasing reliance on oil revenues.  
It was reported that the net proceeds from export sales of petroleum was valued at about 
US$29.4 billion during the period (May 22, 2003 to June 30, 2005). It exceeded the total amount 
of US$31.4 billion allocated to the annual budgets (expenditures) of Iraqi ministries, and 
constituted about 81.5 percent of total payments made by the DFI to cover the overall US$30.0 
billion expenditures for government operations and development costs in Iraq during the same 
period.[24] 
Among many factors contributing to this failure, there were terrorist attacks, institutional collapses, 
corruption, and political uncertainties. However, the lack of economic outlook and inexperience of 
the political parties, and the apparent incompetence of the government officials as well as of the 
former CPA advisors, have substantially contributed to this situation.  
Specifically, premature calls for economic liberalization, especially privatization of the oil industry, 
tight fiscal policy, and non-productive reconstruction and occupation expenditures, have damaged 
the then-strong drive for a free market and a bigger role of private sector. Economic and public 
finance mismanagement have indeed strengthened the tendency for more state economic 
intervention and increased corruption. Ironically, only foreign businesses and trade dealers in Iraq 
have flourished, benefiting from high government and occupation expenditures. 
Obviously, economic revival continues to be one of the main challenges that face both elected 
and future governments. The radical political changes resulting from the election of January 30, 
2005, and the approval of the new constitution with obscure oil and economic tasks of the central 
government, have renewed the impetus for reactivating the suggested economic remedies, as 
past experience has shown the lack of a proper economic plan.  
Indeed, the authorities have failed in clarifying the ambiguity surrounding their radical free market 
policies. The best of post-war experience was to rely mainly on foreign consulting firms and 
international institutions that provided standard documents such as private banking laws, central 
banking laws, neat sheet presentation of annual budget items, and elegant sets of options for 
reform policies and the identification of infrastructure projects and their financial requirements. 
While technical assistance for economic governance has cost USAID only about $183.0 million 
during FY 2003-2006, the efforts fell short with regard to coping with the harsh realities, and 
keeping up the minimum requirements for stimulating the economy.[25] 
Significantly, without a clear economic strategy and policies that determine the allocations of oil 
revenues between the construction of infrastructure (investment) and the government's annual 
budgets, present efforts for redirecting public attention towards a promising role of the UN, World 
Bank, IMF, and the financial contribution of donor countries in the reconstruction of Iraq, would 
neither alleviate economic hardships nor establish a solid foundation for an efficient market 
economy and enterprise culture.  
Except from the likely benefit of writing-off the non-commercial foreign debt,[26] such politically-
oriented promises that lack public debate and serious involvement of native professionals would 
push out further the aim of creating a successful economic model in Iraq. 
NDS Insufficiencies  
An analysis of Iraq's NDS ascertains that misconception still dominates the government's and U.S. 
economic policy in Iraq. NDS is basically an updating and a one-year extension of the previous 
three-year government's annual budget estimates (2004-2006) to cover the years 2005-2007. 
Understandably, the new estimates were based on future oil revenues and government 
expenditures at the time of preparation. Total government expenditures were estimated at 
US$36,842; $40,511, and $38,354 million for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007, respectively, and 
total revenues were estimated at US$32,091, $38,913, and $38,890 million for the years 2005, 
2006, and 2007—there would be deficits for the years 2005 and 2006, and a surplus for 2007. 
However, if we consider the anticipated revenues from foreign fund (loans and grants), which 
constitute 28.0 percent, 25.7 percent and 22.0 percent of total revenues in the years 2005, 2006, 
and 2007, then the real position of the annual budgets would be huge deficits. 
Significantly, oil revenues were assumed to contribute 90.3 percent, 90.9 percent, and 91.6 
percent of domestic revenues, whereas taxes were expected to add only 2.7 percent, 2.5 percent, 
and 2.4 percent in the years 2005, 2006, and 2007. Government investment expenditures were 
estimated at 16 percent, 16 percent, and 17.7 percent of total government expenditures in the 
years 2005, 2006, and 2007. Except for these rough estimates, the NDS lacks a consistent 
strategy and policies that consider the salient economic, social, and political features of the 
country. It only considers the availability of government financial resources, and the mere belief 
that the efficiency of market economy would be enough to deal with the existing problems—i.e., 
economic stagnation, diversification of economic activities, a small role for the private sector, and 
high unemployment and poverty. 
Even its wishful short- and long-term targets reflect limited capacity and narrow prospects. NDS 
aims to reduce the unemployment rate from 43.8 percent in 2004 to 36.3 percent in 2007 and 
21.9 percent in 2015. This is a clear indication of bad planning and inefficient use of public 
resources. In ten years, the outcome of such huge government expenditures would only reduce 
unemployment rate to 21.9 percent! What a hope! Poverty in terms of the proportion of the 
population earning under $1 per day would decrease from 11 percent in 2003 to 8.73 percent in 
2007 and 5.3 percent in 2015. However, poverty assessment may be misleading, as more 
reliable estimates of GDP per capita indicate that the poverty trap is spreading much more than 
the NDS suggests.[27] 
Also, the proportion of the population with sustainable access to improved water would increase 
from 54 percent in 2004 to only 59 percent in 2007 and 75 percent in 2015. As for other quality of 
life indicators, the ratio of telephone line and cellular per 100 people would increase from 5.1 in 
2004 to only 6.2 in 2007 and 10.2 in 2015. The NDS aims to increase personal computer use per 
100 people from 3.6 in 2004 to only 4.3 and 7.2 in the years 2007 and 2015. These are not only 
very disappointing medium- and long-term targets, but also reflect the narrow vision behind these 
commitments.  
As for GDP growth rate, which was estimated at 4.0 percent in 2005, 16.8 percent in 2006, and 
13.6 percent in 2007, the oil sector that contributes between 66 percent to 70 percent of GDP will 
grow at 1.1 percent, 20.0 percent and 14.6 percent in the same years. Since no details were 
given on non-oil GDP, such aggregate estimations may disguise the real limited production 
capacities of non-oil sectors, especially the manufacturing industries, oil products, and agriculture.  
It is clear that planners could not reconcile their ideological belief in free market forces as both a 
necessary and sufficient condition for economic growth and employment with the existing social 
and political conditions—e.g., the high unemployment, poverty, and the alarming problem of wide 
disparities in income and wealth which was missing in the NDS' fiscal policies.[28] In general, the 
NDS also failed to approach the solution of Iraqi economic and social problems within the concept 
of sustainable development—where the environmental elements, human, and natural non-
renewable resources should be considered as important as economic growth. 
The NDS adopted a fiscal policy that increases the economic dependence on foreign loans and 
grants. Since no concrete policy proposals were given to reduce the high dependence on oil 
revenues and foreign loans, the targeted over-expenditures would only deepen the structural 
economic problems and corruption. With regard to sector priorities, it was difficult to evaluate 
them due to a lack of information, although common sense may reach a similar set of general 
priorities. However, assessed by the aim of the NDS strategy "to weave together macroeconomic 
and sectoral analyses and proposals into consistent policy fabric that will bring substantial 
benefits to all regions in Iraqi society," and the given sets of heterogeneous policies and 
measures included in the so called four pillars of the strategy—i.e., "strengthening the foundation 
of economic growth, revitalizing the private sector, improving the quality of life, and strengthening 
good governance and security",[29] then the NDS may be described as a pragmatic short-term 
fiscal policy for dealing with immediate financial needs of governments.  
It is basically a declaration of annual budgets including an unrelated and untidy preamble that 
elaborates the same foundation pillars set up for Iraq by the former CPA, which are also the same 
four strategic areas of USAID mission activities in Iraq. Therefore, the same old criticism directed 
toward CPA policies is also valid for NDS.[30] 
Crucial Transition of Economic Governance 
Iraq is at a crucial phase of economic governance, and if radical changes are not made 
immediately, then the country may deviate further from its previously anticipated high economic 
growth, rapid social development, and flourishing business environment.  
The Islamic parties, with their vague and capricious economic views, dominate the country's 
mainstream politics, while the liberal democrat secular groups are losing their political and 
economic arguments. Also, the Kurdish nationalists/tribal traditional parties, the second most 
important political and social power, are trying to distinguish their own economic and financial 
interests—e.g., strong demand for separate share in oil and natural resources and local tax 
measures.[31] Such unconstructive political developments, coupled with widespread corruption, 
would further pressure the central government to depend more on oil revenues, and politically 
utilize them out of self-interest—and hence restrain the drive for democracy and 
entrepreneurialism. Such a situation may be aggravated by the likely (financial) dispute among 
the federal government and governorates that would further increase their dependence on oil 
revenues and foreign loans. 
Politically, in addition to capable leadership and efficient, decentralized, institutional decision-
making processes, Iraq needs a new political platform that appeals to the low-income groups, and 
helps to produce a growing middle class in terms of income, education, and entrepreneurial skill.  
At this stage, it is therefore extremely essential for the liberal and social democratic political 
movements to build a social-political base by promoting a clear economic and social development 
agenda, where increasing employment opportunities and alleviating poverty are of first priority. At 
the higher level of decision-making authority, a careful compromise must be reached between 
high dependence on oil revenues, and the need to increase the contribution of the private sector 
to the GDP. This is the task of defining a long-term strategy, medium- and short-term policies, 
and prioritizing the reconstruction of infrastructure, guided by clear vision. Such a desired plan 
would also help to expose the terrorists and their non-democratic, false, and misleading claims, 
as well as to combat corruption. 
Conclusions 
Iraq has the required human and natural resources to become a successful, democratic, and free 
market economic model in the Middle East. The failure of its current fiscal and monetary policies, 
economic reforms, and reconstruction of infrastructure necessitates a new initiative.  
In addition to political stability and will, the government should have an inspiring future vision and 
well-defined strategy and policies, rather than old-fashioned practices or business-like 
management. The pace of the required economic liberalization, and increasing the contribution of 
the private sector to the GDP and public finance, will depend on the application of an initiative 
consisting of long-term economic strategy, medium-term structural economic reforms, and short-
term fiscal and monetary stabilization policies—as well as the implementation of an integrated 
program for reconstruction of physical, social, and environmental infrastructure. The tasks of 
identifying and prioritizing the nation-wide physical and environmental infrastructure projects 
should be assigned to the indigenous IDRC as an independent state entity.  
Such an initiative would help the capacity-building process of the government and market 
institutions, and also help maintain transparency and accountability, and combat corruption. 
Politically, the prior commitment by the government, and the mainstream political parties, to such 
an initiative is essential to put the economy on the right track for alleviating unemployment, and 
improving the living standards in the medium- and short -run. It will also help to produce a middle-
class as a main economic, social, and political driving force for development in the longer-run. 
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